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Abstract
Within classical propositional logic, assigning probabilities to for-
mulas is shown to be equivalent to assigning probabilities to valuations.
A novel notion of probabilistic entailment enjoying desirable properties
of logical consequence is proposed and shown to collapse into the clas-
sical entailment when the language is left unchanged. Motivated by
this result, a decidable conservative enrichment of propositional logic
is proposed by giving the appropriate semantics to a new language
construct that allows the constraining of the probability of a formula.
A sound and weakly complete axiomatization is provided using the de-
cidability of the theory of real closed ordered fields.
Keywords: probabilistic propositional logic, stochastic valuation, prob-
abilistic entailment, decidability.
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1 Introduction
Starting as far back as [Ram26] and [Car50], adding probability features to
logic has been a recurrent research topic.
The introduction of probabilities in formal logic is quite challenging since
there is the need to accommodate the continuous nature of probabilities
within the discrete setting of symbolic reasoning. It is also interesting from
the practical point of view since probabilistic reasoning is very relevant in
many fields such as philosophy, economics, computer science and artificial
intelligence.
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Several ways to combine probabilities and logic have been considered.
One can assign probabilities either to formulas or to models. One can either
keep the original language unchanged by introducing probabilities only at
the meta-level or change the language in order to internalize probabilistic
assertions.
For seminal examples of assigning probabilities to formulas while leaving
the formal language unchanged see [Nil86, Hai96, Ada98, Hai11]. Under this
approach, a probabilistic entailment is defined by relating the probabilities
of the hypotheses and the probability of the conclusion.
The approach of assigning probabilities to models was first explored
in [Bur69] and subsequently revisited by several authors, all of them choosing
to change the original language in order to be able to express probabilistic
assertions. Two techniques were considered when endowing models with
probabilities.
The “endogenous” technique adopted by most authors consists of en-
riching each model of the original logic with a probability measure on some
components. For instance, in modal-like logic this approach was followed
for Kripke structures by assigning probabilities to worlds [Bur69, FH94]
or to the pairs in the accessibility relation [vdH92, vBGK09]. This tech-
nique has been quite pervasive in probabilistic versions of logics for rea-
soning about computer programs involving random operations, for exam-
ple in [FH84, HV02, CCFMS07]. It was also used in [Kei85, AH94, OR00,
CFRSS08, KL09, RLS13] for probabilizing predicate logic by assigning prob-
abilities to the individuals in the domain.
The “exogenous” technique consists of assigning a probability to each
model of the original logic or to a class of models of the original logic [Nil86,
Bac90, FHM90, AH94, HM01, Hal05, MSS05, CdCR08, Spe13]. A similar
technique was used in [MS06] for assigning amplitudes to models in order
to set-up a logic for reasoning about quantum systems.
The existence of so diverse proposals of incorporating probability into
formal logic raises the problem of expressivity namely, for instance, if nesting
probability operators will be more expressive. The negative answer is given
in [BCF14].
In this paper, within the setting of propositional logic, we propose in
Section 2 the novel notion of stochastic valuation and its main properties.
The section ends with the proof of the equivalence of assigning probabilities
to formulas and assigning probabilities to valuations. Afterwards, we address
two problems using the latter approach via stochastic valuations.
First, leaving the language unchanged, in Section 3 we start by criticiz-
ing the definition of probabilistic entailment introduced in [Hai96, Hai11]
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and then propose a novel notion enjoying the usual properties of a logical
consequence. The section ends with the proof of the collapse of probabilistic
entailment into classical entailment.
Second, since nothing is gained by probabilizing formulas or models while
keeping the language unchanged, we propose in Section 4 a small enrich-
ment (PPL) of propositional logic by providing the appropriate stochastic-
valuation semantics to a new language constructor that allows (without nest-
ing) the constraining of the probability of a formula. At the end of Section 4,
capitalizing on the decidability of the theory of real closed ordered fields, we
present an axiomatization of PPL. This axiomatization is shown to be sound
and weakly complete in Section 5. Moreover, we prove in Section 6 that PPL
is a decidable conservative extension of classical propositional logic.
The paper ends with an assessment of what was achieved and a brief
discussion of possible future work in Section 7.
2 Stochastic valuations
Towards endowing propositional logic with a probabilistic semantics, we
introduce here the notion of stochastic valuation and show that it induces
a probability assignment to formulas that fulfils the principles postulated
in [Ada98]. We also show that each probability assignment to formulas
fulfilling those principles induces a unique stochastic valuation that recovers
the original assignment. These results allow us to conclude that the choice
of assigning probabilities to valuations or to formulas is immaterial. In
the subsequent sections of this paper we stick to the approach of assigning
probabilities to valuations using stochastic valuations.
Throughout the paper, L is the propositional language generated by the
set B = {Bj : j ∈ N} of propositional symbols using the connectives ¬
and ⊃. The other connectives, as well as tt (verum) and ff (falsum), are
introduced as abbreviations as usual. Recall that a (classical) valuation is a
map v : B → {0, 1}. Given A ∈ ℘+
fin
B, we say that an A-valuation is a map
u : A→ {0, 1}.1 We use v c α for stating that valuation v satisfies formula
α and ∆ c α for stating that ∆ entails α, that is v c α whenever v c δ
for every δ ∈ ∆.
When probabilizing valuations one might be tempted to look at proba-
bilistic valuations as random variables taking values on the set of all classical
1Given a set S, we denote the collection of its subsets by ℘S, the collection of its
non-empty subsets by ℘+S, the collection of its finite subsets by ℘finS and the collection
of its non-empty finite subsets by ℘+
fin
S.
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valuations. However, it turns out that it is much better to look at them as
stochastic processes as follows.
By a stochastic valuation V we mean a collection {VBj : Bj ∈ B} of
discrete random variables defined on a probability space (Ω,F , µ) and taking
values in {0, 1}.
In other words, such a V is a stochastic process indexed by B where Ω
is the set of outcomes, F ⊆ ℘Ω is the σ-field of events, µ : F → [0, 1] is the
probability measure and each VBj : Ω → {0, 1} is a measurable map (that
is, such that (VBj )
−1(S) ∈ F for every S ⊆ {0, 1}). For further details on
the notion of stochastic process consult, for instance, [Bil12].
For the purposes of this paper it is convenient to identify each valuation
v with the subset {Bj : v(Bj) = 1} of B. Accordingly, restriction is achieved
by intersection: given a subset A of B, v|A = v ∩A.
Moreover, it becomes handy to assume that each random variable VBj
takes values in {∅, {Bj}} with ∅ standing for 0 and {Bj} for 1.
Then, given a non-empty finite subset A = {Bj1 , . . . , Bjn} of B and
U ⊆ A, we write
Prob(VA = U)
for the (joint) probability (given by V )
µ
(
n⋂
k=1
(VBjk )
−1(U ∩ {Bjk})
)
of each Bjk ∈ U being true and each Bjk ∈ A \ U being false.
In particular,
Prob(VBj = {Bj}) = µ
(
(VBj )
−1({Bj})
)
is the probability (given by V ) of Bj being true while
Prob(VBj = ∅) = µ
(
(VBj )
−1(∅)
)
is the probability (given by V ) of Bj being false.
Each stochastic valuation V induces the family
{U 7→ Prob(VA = U) : ℘A→ [0, 1]}A∈℘+
fin
B
of finite-dimensional (joint probability) distributions that we may call finite-
dimensional probabilistic valuations.
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This family is consistent in the sense that the following marginal condi-
tion holds:
Prob(VA′ = U
′) =
∑
U ⊆ A
U∩A′=U ′
Prob(VA = U) ∀A∈℘
+
fin
B ∀A′∈℘+A ∀U ′∈℘A′.
Conversely, given a consistent system of finite-dimensional distributions
(in our case, finite-dimensional probabilistic valuations), the Kolmogorov
existence theorem (see Section 36 of [Bil12]) guarantees the existence of a
unique stochastic process (in our case, a unique stochastic valuation) that
induces those finite-dimensional distributions. This theorem will be fre-
quently used in the paper. Its availability well justifies our claim that it is
much better to probabilize valuations using stochastic processes.
Given α ∈ L, let Bα be the set of propositional symbols occurring in
α and [[α]] be the set {v ∩ Bα : v c α} of the restrictions to Bα of the
valuations that satisfy α.
With these notions and notation at hand we are ready to compute the
probability that a stochastic valuation assigns to a formula.
Given α ∈ L and a stochastic valuation V , the probability of α under V ,
is computed as follows:
ProbV (α) =
∑
U∈[[α]]
Prob(VBα = U).
That is, the probability of α under V is the sum of the probabilities of the re-
strictions to Bα of the classical valuations that satisfy α. These probabilities
are provided by the finite-dimensional probabilistic valuation
U 7→ Prob(VBα = U) : ℘Bα → [0, 1]
induced by V on Bα.
The probabilities that a stochastic valuation assigns to formulas fulfil
the principles postulated by Adams (in [Ada98]) as we now proceed to show.
Recall that according to Adams, a probability assignment is a map P on L
satisfying the following principles:
P1 0 ≤ P (α) ≤ 1;
P2 If c α then P (α) = 1;
P3 If α c β then P (α) ≤ P (β);
P4 If c ¬(β ∧ α) then P (β ∨ α) = P (β) + P (α).
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Some notation and a few auxiliary results are needed before showing that
the probability assignment to formulas induced by a stochastic valuation
does indeed fulfil these four principles.
Given U ⊆ A ⊆ B, we use the abbreviation
φUA for
 ∧
Bj∈U
Bj
 ∧
 ∧
Bj∈A\U
¬Bj
 .
Clearly, this formula identifies the A-valuation that makes each Bj in U true
and each Bj not in U false. Observe that, for each such U and A, the set
{v ∩A : v c φ
U
A}
is the singleton {U}. Remark also that the set BφUA
of propositional symbols
occurring in φUA coincides with A.
Proposition 2.1 Let U1, U2 ⊆ A ⊆ B be such that U1 6= U2. Then
c ¬(φ
U1
A ∧ φ
U2
A )
Proof:
Let v be a valuation. Assume, by contradiction, that v c φ
U1
A and v c φ
U2
A .
Without loss of generality, let Bj be a symbol in U1 but not in U2. Then,
v c Bj and v c ¬Bj which is a contradiction. QED
Proposition 2.2 Let A ⊆ B. Then
c
∨
U⊆A
φUA.
Proof:
Let v be a valuation. Then, it is straightforward to see that v c φ
v∩A
A .
QED
Proposition 2.3 Let U ′ ⊆ A′ ⊆ A ⊆ B. Then
c
 ∨
U ⊆ A
U ∩A′ = U ′
φUA
≡ φU ′A′ .
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Proof:
Let v be a valuation.
(→) Assume that
v c
 ∨
U ⊆ A
U ∩A′ = U ′
φUA
 .
Then, v c φ
U
A for some U ⊆ A such that U ∩ A
′ = U ′. Let Bj ∈ U
′.
Then, Bj ∈ U ∩ A
′ and so v c Bj since v c φ
U
A. Let Bj ∈ A
′ \ U ′. Then,
Bj 6∈ U ∩A
′ and so Bj 6∈ U . Hence, v 6c Bj since v c φ
U
A. Thus, v c φ
U ′
A′ .
(←) Assume that v c φ
U ′
A′ . Observe that v c φ
v∩A
A . Moreover, v ∩ A ⊆ A
and (v ∩A) ∩A′ = v ∩A′ = U ′ since v c φ
U ′
A′ . QED
Proposition 2.4 Let δ, φ be formulas and V a stochastic valuation. Then∑
U∈{v∩(Bδ∪Bφ):vcδ}
Prob(VBδ∪Bφ = U) =
∑
U ′∈{v∩Bδ :vcδ}
Prob(VBδ = U
′).
Proof:
Observe that:∑
U ′∈{v∩Bδ :vcδ}
Prob(VBδ = U
′)
=
∑
U ′∈{v∩Bδ :vcδ}
∑
U ⊆ Bδ ∪ Bφ
U ∩Bδ = U
′
Prob(VBδ∪Bφ = U) (∗)
=
∑
U ⊆ Bδ ∪ Bφ
U ∩ Bδ ∈ {v ∩ Bδ : v c δ}
Prob(VBδ∪Bφ = U)
=
∑
U∈{v∩(Bδ∪Bφ):vcδ}
Prob(VBδ∪Bφ = U) (∗∗)
where (∗) follows by the marginal condition and (∗∗) is proved now. Indeed
U ⊆ Bδ∪Bφ and U∩Bδ ∈ {v∩Bδ : v c δ} iff U ∈ {v∩(Bδ∪Bφ) : v c δ}
since:
(→) Assume that U ⊆ Bδ∪Bφ and U∩Bδ ∈ {v∩Bδ : v c δ}. Let v be such
that U ∩Bδ = v ∩Bδ and v c δ. Let v
′ be such that v′ ∩Bδ = v ∩Bδ and
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v′ ∩ (Bδ ∪Bφ) = U . Then, v
′
c δ. Therefore, U ∈ {v ∩ (Bδ ∪Bφ) : v c δ}.
(←) Assume that U ∈ {v ∩ (Bδ ∪ Bφ) : v c δ}. Let v be such that
U = v ∩ (Bδ ∪ Bφ) and v c δ. Thus, U ⊆ Bδ ∪ Bφ. Moreover U ∩ Bδ =
v ∩ (Bδ ∪Bφ) ∩Bδ = v ∩Bδ. Hence U ∩Bδ ∈ {v ∩Bδ : v c δ}. QED
Proposition 2.5 Let δ, α be formulas such that δ c α. Then
ProbV (δ) ≤ ProbV (α).
Proof:
Observe that
ProbV (δ) =
∑
U ′∈[[δ]]
Prob(VBδ = U
′)
=
∑
U ′∈[[δ]]
∑
U ⊆ Bδ ∪ Bα
U ∩ Bδ = U
′
Prob(VBδ∪Bα = U) (∗)
=
∑
U ⊆ Bδ ∪ Bα
U ∩ Bδ ∈ [[δ]]
Prob(VBδ∪Bα = U)
≤
∑
U ⊆ Bδ ∪ Bα
U ∩ Bα ∈ [[α]]
Prob(VBδ∪Bα = U) (∗∗)
=
∑
U ′∈[[α]]
∑
U ⊆ Bδ ∪ Bα
U ∩ Bα = U ′
Prob(VBδ∪Bα = U)
=
∑
U ′∈[[α]]
Prob(VBα = U
′) (∗)
= ProbV (α)
where (∗) follow from the marginal condition on V and (∗∗) comes from the
fact that
{U : U ⊆ Bδ ∪Bα, U ∩Bδ ∈ [[δ]]} ⊆ {U : U ⊆ Bδ ∪Bα, U ∩Bα ∈ [[α]]}
as we now show. Let U ⊆ Bδ ∪ Bα be such that U ∩ Bδ ∈ [[δ]]. Let v be a
valuation such that
v ∩ (Bδ ∪Bα) = U.
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Then, v ∩ Bδ = v ∩ (Bδ ∪ Bα) ∩ Bδ = U ∩ Bδ and so v ∩ Bδ ∈ [[δ]]. Hence,
v c δ and thus
v c α
since δ c α. Therefore, v ∩Bα ∈ [[α]]. Since
v ∩Bα = v ∩ (Bδ ∪Bα) ∩Bα = U ∩Bα
then U ∩Bα ∈ [[α]]. QED
Proposition 2.6 Given a formula α and a stochastic valuation V ,
c α implies ProbV (α) = 1.
Proof:
Assume c α. Then,
[[α]] = ℘Bα.
Indeed it is immediate that [[α]] ⊆ ℘Bα. For the other direction, let U ⊆ Bα.
Pick a valuation v such that v ∩Bα = U . Then, U ∈ [[α]] since v c α.
Hence
ProbV (α) =
∑
U∈[[α]]
Prob(VBα = U) =
∑
U⊆Bα
Prob(VBα = U) = 1.
QED
With these results in hand we are ready to show that every stochastic
valuation assigns probabilities to formulas fulfilling Adams’ principles.
Theorem 2.7 Let V be a stochastic valuation. Then, V̂ = ProbV is a
probability assignment.
Proof:
Indeed, all the properties of probability assignments are satisfied:
P1 Direct from the fact that VBα is a probability distribution for every α.
P2 Follows immediately from Proposition 2.6.
P3. This fact was proved in Proposition 2.5.
P4 Assume that c ¬(β∧α). Then, there is no valuation v such that v c β
and v c α. Hence,
ProbV (β ∨ α) =
∑
U∈[[β∨α]]
Prob(VBβ∪Bα = U)
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=
∑
U∈{v∩(Bβ∪Bα):vcβ∨α}
Prob(VBβ∪Bα = U)
=
∑
U∈{v∩(Bβ∪Bα):vcβ or vcα}
Prob(VBβ∪Bα = U)
=
∑
U∈{v∩(Bβ∪Bα):vcβ}
Prob(VBβ∪Bα = U) +
∑
U∈{v∩(Bβ∪Bα):vcα}
Prob(VBβ∪Bα = U)
=
∑
U∈{v∩Bβ :vcβ}
Prob(VBβ = U) +
∑
U∈{v∩Bα:vcα}
Prob(VBα = U) (∗)
=
∑
U∈[[β]]
Prob(VBβ = U) +
∑
U∈[[α]]
Prob(VBα = U)
= ProbV (β) + ProbV (α)
where (∗) follows by Proposition 2.4. QED
We now show the converse result: each probability assignment induces
a stochastic valuation giving back the original assignment. To this end,
we first spell-out the family of finite-dimensional probabilistic valuations
induced by a probability assignment and show that it fulfils the marginal
condition. Afterwards, the envisaged stochastic valuation is obtained using
Kolmogorov’s existence theorem.
Given a probability assignment P , let
ηP = {ηPA = U 7→ P (φ
U
A) : ℘A→ [0, 1]}A∈℘+
fin
B .
Proposition 2.8 Let P be a probability assignment. There exists a unique
stochastic valuation
qP
such that Prob( qPA = U) = P (φ
U
A).
Proof:
(1) Each ηPA is a finite-dimensional probabilitistic valuation:
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(a) ηPA(U) ∈ [0, 1]. Follows immediately from P1.
(b)
∑
U⊆A η
P
A(U) = 1. Indeed:∑
U⊆A
ηPA(U) =
∑
U⊆A
P (φUA)
= P
 ∨
U⊆A
φUA
 (∗)
= 1 (∗∗)
where (∗) follows from Proposition 2.1 and P4 and (∗∗) follows from Propo-
sition 2.2 and P2.
(c) Additivity is trivial since we are dealing with a measure over a finite set
of outcomes.
(2) The family ηP fulfils the marginal condition. Assume that A′ ⊆ A and
U ′ ⊆ A′. Then,∑
U ⊆ A
U ∩ A′ = U ′
ηPA(U) =
∑
U ⊆ A
U ∩A′ = U ′
P (φUA)
= P
 ∨
U ⊆ A
U ∩ A′ = U ′
φUA
 (∗)
= P (φU
′
A′ ) (∗∗)
= ηPA′(U
′)
where (∗) follows from Proposition 2.1 and P4 and (∗∗) follows from Propo-
sition 2.3 and P3.
Hence, using Kolmogorov’s existence theorem, there exists a unique stochas-
tic valuation having these finite-dimensional distributions. Let qP be this
stochastic valuation. QED
We now proceed to show that qP induces back the original probability
assignment P and, conversely, that a stochastic valuation V induces the
probability assignment V̂ that gives back the original V . To this end, we
need the following auxiliary result.
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Proposition 2.9 Let U ′ ⊆ A′ ⊆ A ⊆ B and β a formula in L. Then
c
 ∨
U∈{v∩Bβ :vcβ}
φUBβ
≡ β.
Proof:
Let v be a valuation.
(→) Assume that
v c
 ∨
U∈{v∩Bβ :vcβ}
φUBβ
 .
Let U ∈ {v ∩Bβ : v c β} be such that
v c φ
U
Bβ
.
Then, there is v′ such that U = v′ ∩Bβ and v
′
c β. Hence
v c φ
v′∩Bβ
Bβ
(†).
We now show that v′ ∩ Bβ = v ∩ Bβ. Let Bj ∈ v
′ ∩ Bβ. Then, v c Bj by
(†) and so Bj ∈ v ∩ Bβ . For the other direction let Bj ∈ v ∩ Bβ. By (†),
Bj ∈ v
′. Hence Bj ∈ v
′ ∩Bβ.
Therefore,
U = v ∩Bβ
and so v c β.
(←) Assume that v′ c β. Observe that v
′
c φ
v′∩Bβ
Bβ
. Then, v′ ∩ Bβ ∈
{v ∩Bβ : v c β} and so the thesis follows. QED
Theorem 2.10 Let V be a stochastic valuation and P a probability assign-
ment. Then,
q̂
V = V and q̂P = P.
Proof:
Let A ∈ ℘+
fin
B and U ⊆ A. Observe that we have:
Prob(
q̂
V A = U) = V̂ (φ
U
A)
= ProbV (φ
U
A)
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=
∑
U ′∈[[φUA]]
Prob(VB
φU
A
= U ′)
= Prob(VB
φU
A
= U)
= Prob(VA = U).
Therefore, the stochastic valuations
q̂
V and V have the same finite-dimensional
probabilistic valuations and, so, by the Kolmogorov’s existence theorem,
they are equivalent.
Moreover, let β ∈ L. Then:
q̂P (β) = Prob qP (β) =
∑
U∈[[β]]
Prob( qPBβ = U)
=
∑
U∈{v∩Bβ :vcβ}
P (φUBβ )
= P
 ∨
U∈{v∩Bβ :vcβ}
φUBβ
 (∗)
= P (β) (∗∗)
where (∗) follows from Proposition 2.1 and P4 and (∗∗) is a consequence of
Proposition 2.9 and P3. QED
In short, there is a strict Galois connection between stochastic valuations
and probability assignments to (classical) formulas. Therefore, we can freely
choose to assign probabilities to formulas or to valuations. In the remainder
of this paper we adopt the latter approach, using stochastic valuations for
the purpose.
3 Probabilistic entailment
In this section, we compare the entailment in CPL (classical propositional
logic with valuations as semantics) with the probabilistic entailments that
we are able to define in svPL (a variant of CPL with the same language but
adopting stochastic valuations as semantics). The key result of this section
is the collapse of these probabilistic entailments into the classical entailment.
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It is possible to define in svPL a family qp of probabilistic entailments
depending on the minimal probability p required from the hypotheses in
order to obtain the conclusion with at least probability q. To this end, we
first define satisfaction by a stochastic valuation of a formula with a minimal
probability p.
Let V be a stochastic valuation, α ∈ L and p ∈ [0, 1]. We say that α is
p-satisfied by V , written
V p α,
whenever ProbV (α) ≥ p. That is, a formula is p-satisfied by V whenever its
probability under V is at least p.
According to Hailperin [Hai96, Hai11], given ∆∪{α} ⊆ L and p, q ∈ [0, 1],
one would say that ∆ pq-entails α, written here
∆ ¨
q
p α,
whenever, for every stochastic valuation V ,
if V p δ for every δ ∈ ∆ then V q α.
That is, if the probability under V of each hypothesis is at least p then the
probability under V of the conclusion is at least q.
However, we find this definition wanting since ¨
q
p does not enjoy the
following desirable property:
δ1, δ2 ¨
q
p α iff δ1 ∧ δ2 ¨
q
p α.
Indeed, for instance,
B1 ∧ (¬B1) ¨
1
4
1
2
ff
while
B1,¬B1 6 ¨
1
4
1
2
ff.
The former holds vacuously because [[B1 ∧ (¬B1)]] = ∅. Concerning the
latter, observe that it is easy to find a stochastic valuation V such that
ProbV (B1) = Prob(¬B1) =
1
2 and note that every stochastic valuation as-
signs probability zero to ff since [[ff]] = ∅. In fact, Hailperin’s concept requires
that both δ1 and δ2 have probability greater than or equal to p of being true
when one should instead require that the probability of them being simul-
taneously true is greater than or equal to p.
In order to overcome this difficulty, we propose to use the following notion
of probabilistic entailment where, as usual, for any finite set Φ of formulas,
14
we write
∧
Φ for the conjunction of the formulas in Φ, with
∧
∅ standing
for tt.
Let ∆ ∪ {α} ⊆ L and p, q ∈ (0, 1] such that p ≥ q. We say that ∆
pq-entails α, written
∆ qp α,
whenever there is a finite subset Φ of ∆ such that, for every stochastic
valuation V ,
if V p
∧
Φ then V q α.
Clearly,
∆ qp α iff ∃Φ∈℘fin∆ :
∧
Φ ¨
q
p α.
Thus, when ∆ is a singleton or the empty set the two definitions coincide.
Note that the requirement q > 0 is well justified because 0p is triv-
ial. Indeed, every formula is p0-entailed by any set of hypotheses since
ProbV (α) ≥ 0 for every stochastic valuation V and formula α.
Observe also that the requirement p ≥ q is essential since otherwise the
induced pq-entailment operator
∆ 7→ ∆
q
p = {α ∈ L : ∆ qp α} : ℘L→ ℘L
would not be extensive. Indeed, for instance,
B1 6 
3
4
1
4
B1.
It is straightforward to verify that the pq-entailment operator is extensive
if p ≥ q, as well as monotonic for arbitrary p and q. On the other hand, it is
not clear from the definition if it is idempotent. In fact, each pq-entailment
operator is indeed idempotent but the proof is not trivial. Idempotence is
not used on the way to the collapsing theorem at the end of this section.
Moreover, it follows immediately from that theorem. Therefore, we refrain
from attempting at this point to prove the idempotence of each pq-entailment
operator. Observe also that it follows directly from its definition that each
operator is compact.
The aim now is to compare the probabilistic entailments of svPL with
the entailment of CPL.
To this end, we need to explain how a classical valuation canonically
induces a stochastic valuation. Given a valuation v, consider the family of
maps
ηv = {ηvA : ℘A→ [0, 1]}A∈℘+
fin
B
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where each map is as follows:
ηvA(U) =
{
1 U = v ∩A
0 otherwise.
Proposition 3.1 Given a valuation v, ηv is a consistent family of finite
dimensional probability valuations.
Proof:
Since it is straightforward to check that each ηvA is a probability measure
over A, we focus on showing that ηv fulfils the marginal condition. Let
A ∈ ℘+
fin
B, A′ ∈ ℘+A and U ′ ∈ ℘A′. Then, consider two cases:
(i) v∩A′ = U ′. Observe that v∩A ⊆ A and v∩A∩A′ = v∩A′ = U ′. Hence∑
U ⊆ A
U ∩ A′ = U ′
ηvA(U) = 1 = ηA′(U
′).
(ii) v ∩A′ 6= U ′. Then, v ∩A ∩A′ = v ∩A′ 6= U ′ and so∑
U ⊆ A
U ∩ A′ = U ′
ηvA(U) = 0 = ηA′(U
′).
QED
Therefore, using Kolmogorov’s existence theorem, there exists a unique
stochastic valuation V v inducing the finite-dimensional probability valua-
tions in ηv. We say that V v is the stochastic valuation induced by v. Observe
that
Prob(V vA = U) = η
v
A(U)
for each A ∈ ℘+
fin
B and U ⊆ A. The next result establishes the envisaged re-
lationship between satisfaction by a valuation and satisfaction by its induced
stochastic valuation.
Proposition 3.2 Given a formula α ∈ L, a valuation v and p ∈ (0, 1]
v c α iff V
v
p α.
Proof:
(→) Assume that v c α. Then
v ∩Bα ∈ [[α]]
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by definition of [[α]]. Hence,
ProbV v(α) =
∑
U∈[[α]]
Prob(V vBα = U) = Prob(V
v
Bα = v ∩Bα) = 1 ≥ p,
by definition of V v. So, V v p α.
(←) Assume that V v p α. Then, ProbV v(α) ≥ p. Hence,∑
U∈[[α]]
Prob(V vBα = U) ≥ p > 0.
Observe that Prob(V vBα = U) = 0 for every U 6= v ∩ Bα and Prob(V
v
Bα
=
v ∩Bα) = 1. Therefore, v ∩Bα ∈ [[α]]. Thus, v c α. QED
We now proceed with the investigation of the relationship between the
probabilistic entailments and the classical entailment. To this end, we need
the following auxiliary result.
Proposition 3.3 Given formulas δ and α with δ c α and p, q ∈ (0, 1] with
p ≥ q,
if V p δ then V q α
for every stochastic valuation V .
Proof:
Let V be a stochastic valuation such that V p δ. Hence,
ProbV (δ) ≥ p.
So, by Proposition 2.5,
ProbV (α) ≥ ProbV (δ) ≥ p ≥ q.
Thus, V q α. QED
The next result shows that the probabilistic entailments collapse into
the classical entailment.
Theorem 3.4 Given a set of formulas ∆, a formula α and p, q ∈ (0, 1] with
p ≥ q,
∆ c α iff ∆ 
q
p α.
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Proof:
(→) Assume that ∆ c α, and let Φ be a finite subset of ∆ such that Φ c α.
Hence,
∧
Φ c α. Thus, by Proposition 3.3, if V p
∧
Φ then V q α, for
every stochastic valuation V . Therefore, by definition, ∆ qp α.
(←) Assume that ∆ qp α, and let Φ be a finite subset of ∆ such that, for
every stochastic valuation V ,
if V p
∧
Φ then V q α.
Let v be a valuation such that v c δ for each δ ∈ ∆. Then, v c
∧
Φ.
Observe that p > 0. Then, V v p
∧
Φ, by Proposition 3.2. So, V v q α
because ∆ qp α. Thus, again by Proposition 3.2, v c α since q > 0. QED
In conclusion, since nothing is gained in terms of entailment by enriching
the semantics of the classical proposicional logic with the means for assign-
ing probabilities to formulas, it is necessary to extend the language with
probabilistic constructs. That is precisely the objective of the rest of this
paper.
4 Probabilistic propositional logic
The objective of this section is to define an enrichment of CPL that captures
the probabilistic nature of the semantics provided by stochastic valuations.
The idea is to add as little as possible to the propositional language L. It
turns out that adding a symbolic construct allowing the constraining of the
probability of a formula is enough.
Before proceeding with the presentation of the envisaged probabilistic
propositional logic (PPL), we need to adopt some notation concerning the
first-order theory of real closed ordered fields (RCOF), having in mind the
use of its terms for denoting probabilities and other quantities.
Recall that the first-order signature of RCOF contains the constants 0
and 1, the unary function symbol −, the binary function symbols + and ×,
and the binary predicate symbols = and <. We take the set X = XN ∪XL,
where XN = {xk : k ∈ N} and XL = {xα : α ∈ L}, as the set of variables.
In the sequel, by TRCOF we mean the set of terms in RCOF that do not use
variables in XL. As we shall see, the variables in XL become handy in the
proposed axiomatization PPL, for representing within the language of RCOF
the probability of α.
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As usual, we may write t1 ≤ t2 for (t1 < t2) ∨ (t1 = t2), t1 t2 for t1 × t2
and tn for
t× · · · × t︸ ︷︷ ︸
n times
.
Furthermore, we also use the following abbreviations for any given m ∈ N+
and n ∈ N:
• m for 1 + · · ·+ 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
addition of m units
;
• m−1 for the unique z such that m× z = 1;
•
n
m
for m−1 × n.
The last two abbreviations might be extended to other terms, but we need
them only for numerals. For the sake of simplicity, we do not notationally
distinguish between a natural number and the corresponding numeral.
In order to avoid confusion with the other notions of satisfaction used
herein, we adopt fo for denoting satisfaction in first-order logic (over the
language of RCOF).
Recall also that the theory RCOF is decidable [Tar51]. This fact will
be put to good use in the axiomatization for PPL (presented at the end of
this section) and, further on (in Section 6), when proving the decidability of
PPL. Furthermore, every model of RCOF satisfies the theorems and only the
theorems of RCOF (Corollary 3.3.16 in [Mar02]). We shall take advantage
of this result in the semantics of PPL for adopting the ordered field R of the
real numbers as the model of RCOF.
4.1 Language
The language LPPL of the propositional probability logic PPL is inductively
defined as follows:
•
∫
α@ p ∈ LPPL where α ∈ L, p ∈ TRCOF and @ ∈ {=, <};
• ϕ1 ⊃ ϕ2 ∈ LPPL whenever ϕ1, ϕ2 ∈ LPPL.
Propositional abbreviations can be introduced as usual. For instance,
¬ϕ for ϕ⊃ (
∫
tt < 1)
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and similarly for ∧, ∨ and ≡. Comparison abbreviations also become handy.
For instance, ∫
α ≤ p for (
∫
α = p) ∨ (
∫
α < p)
and ∫
α ≥ p for ¬(
∫
α < p).
4.2 Semantics
Given a term t and an assignment ρ : X → R, we write tRρ for the denotation
of term t in R for ρ. When t does not contain variables we may use tR for
the denotation of t in R.
Let V be a stochastic valuation and ρ an assignment. Satisfaction of
formulas by V and ρ is inductively defined as follows:
• V ρ 
∫
α@ p whenever ProbV (α) @ p
Rρ;
• V ρ  ϕ1 ⊃ ϕ2 whenever V ρ 6 ϕ1 or V ρ  ϕ2.
We may omit the reference to the assignment ρ whenever the formula does
not include variables.
Let Γ ⊆ LPPL and ϕ ∈ LPPL. We say that Γ entails ϕ, written Γ  ϕ,
whenever, for every stochastic valuation V and assignment ρ, if V ρ  γ for
each γ ∈ Γ then V ρ  ϕ. As expected, ϕ is said to be valid when  ϕ.
Observe that entailment in PPL is not compact. Indeed, since R is
Archimedean, {∫
α ≤
1
n
: n ∈ N
}

∫
α = 0.
However, there is no finite subset Ψ of {
∫
α ≤ 1
n
: n ∈ N} such that
Ψ 
∫
α = 0.
4.3 Calculus
The PPL calculus combines propositional reasoning with RCOF reasoning.
We intend to use the RCOF reasoning to a minimum, namely to prove as-
sertions like (∫
α1 @1 p1 ∧ · · · ∧
∫
αk @k pk
)
⊃
∫
αk+1 @k+1 pk+1.
To this end, we represent in RCOF the probability
∫
α of each proposi-
tional formula α by variable xα and impose conditions on that variable that
effect the properties of the probability.
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Recall that the probability of a formula α is the sum of the probabilities
of the Bα-valuations that satisfy the formula and that there is a disjunctive
normal form of α where each disjunct can be seen as identifying a Bα-
valuation that satisfies the formula. Hence, for calculating the probability
of α it is enough to sum the probabilities of each such disjunct.
As we proceed to explain, we collect these conditions in a formula of
RCOF. We say that Λ = {α11, . . . , α1m1 , . . . , αk1, . . . , αkmk} ⊂ L is an ade-
quate set of DNF-conjuncts for {α1, . . . , αk} ⊂ L whenever
1. Bα11 = · · · = Bαkmk = Bα1 ∪ · · · ∪Bαk = BΛ;
2. each αjℓ is a conjunction of literals;
3. c ¬(αjℓ ∧ αjℓ′) for 1 ≤ ℓ 6= ℓ
′ ≤ mj ;
4. c αj ≡
∨mj
ℓ=1 αjℓ for each j = 1, . . . , k.
Observe that clauses 2 and 4 ensure that
∨mj
ℓ=1 αjℓ is a disjunctive normal
form of αj. Moreover, clause 3 guarantees that there are not redundant
disjuncts in the disjunctive normal form of each αj . Given such set Λ of
adequate DNF-conjuncts for α1, . . . , αk, we use the abbreviation
Qα1,...,αkα11,...,αkmk
for the RCOF formula ∧
U⊆BΛ
0 ≤ xφUBΛ
≤ 1
 ∧
 ∑
U⊆BΛ
xφUBΛ
= 1
 ∧
 k∧
j=1
(
xαj =
mj∑
ℓ=1
xαjℓ
) .
Recall that each propositional formula φUBΛ identifies the BΛ-valuation that
assigns true to the propositional symbols in U and assigns false to the propo-
sitional symbols in BΛ \ U . Hence,
0 ≤ xφUBΛ
≤ 1
imposes that the probability of each BΛ-valuation should be in the interval
[0, 1] and ∑
U⊆BΛ
xφUBΛ
= 1
imposes in RCOF that the sum of the probabilities of all BΛ-valuations is 1.
The conjunct
xαj =
mj∑
ℓ=1
xαjℓ
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imposes that the probability of αj is the sum of the probabilities of the
valuations that satisfy the formula.
The calculus for PPL is an extension of the classical propositional calculus
containing the following axioms and rules:
TT
ϕ
provided that ϕ is a tautological formula;
RR (∫
α1 @1 p1 ∧ · · · ∧
∫
αk @k pk
)
⊃
∫
αk+1 @k+1 pk+1
provided that there is an adequate set
{α11, . . . , α1m1 , . . . , α(k+1)1, . . . , α(k+1)mk+1}
of DNF-conjuncts for {α1, . . . , αk+1} such that
∀
Qα1,...,αk+1α11,...,αk+1mk+1 ∧ k∧
j=1
(
xαj @j pj
)⊃ (xαk+1 @k+1 pk+1)

is a theorem of RCOF;
MP
ϕ1 ϕ1 ⊃ ϕ2
ϕ2
.
Axioms TT and rule MP extend the propositional reasoning to formulas
in LPPL. Axioms RR import to PPL all we need from RCOF.
4.4 Examples
Consider the derivation in Figure 1 for establishing that
⊢
∫
α ≤ 1
holds for arbitrary α ∈ L. The use of RR axioms can be involved. We explain
their use only for obtaining
∫
tt = 1 (step 2 of the derivation). Assume that
tt is an abbreviation of B1 ∨ (¬B1). Then the following formula is in RCOF:
∀ (QttB1,¬B1 ⊃ (xtt = 1))
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1
∫
(α⊃ tt) = 1 RR
2
∫
tt = 1 RR
3 (
∫
(α⊃ tt) = 1)⊃ ((
∫
tt = 1)⊃ ((
∫
(α⊃ tt) = 1) ∧ (
∫
tt = 1))) TT
4 (
∫
tt = 1)⊃ ((
∫
(α⊃ tt) = 1) ∧ (
∫
tt = 1)) MP 1, 3
5 (
∫
(α⊃ tt) = 1) ∧ (
∫
tt = 1) MP 2, 4
6 ((
∫
(α⊃ tt) = 1) ∧ (
∫
tt = 1))⊃ (
∫
α ≤ 1) RR
7
∫
α ≤ 1 MP 5, 6
Figure 1: ⊢
∫
α ≤ 1.
where QttB1,¬B1 is
(0 ≤ xB1 ≤ 1) ∧ (0 ≤ x¬B1 ≤ 1)
∧
xB1 + x¬B1 = 1
∧
xtt = xB1 + x¬B1 ,
and, so,
∫
tt = 1 is obtained by RR.
Next, let us see how we can express and derive (binary) additivity, i.e.,
how we can establish that∫
α = x1,
∫
β = x2,
∫
(α ∧ β) = x3 ⊢
∫
(α ∨ β) = x1 + x2 − x3
holds for arbitrary α, β ∈ L. This follows immediately using RR since, let-
ting {α11, . . . , α4m4} be an adequate set of DNF-conjuncts for {α1, . . . , α4}
where
• α1 is α;
• α2 is β;
• α3 is α∧β and each α3ℓ is a common disjunct in the disjunctive normal
form of α1 and α2;
• α4 is α ∨ β and each α4ℓ is a disjunct in the disjunctive normal form
of α1 and α2 with no repetitions;
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1
∫
(B1 ∧ (¬B2)) = x1 HYP
2
∫
(B1 ∧B2) = x2 HYP
3 (
∫
(B1 ∧ (¬B2)) = x1)⊃ ((
∫
(B1 ∧B2) = x2)⊃
((
∫
(B1 ∧ (¬B2)) = x1) ∧ (
∫
(B1 ∧B2) = x2))) TT
4 (
∫
(B1 ∧B2) = x2)⊃
((
∫
(B1 ∧ (¬B2)) = x1) ∧ (
∫
(B1 ∧B2) = x2)) MP 1, 3
5 (
∫
(B1 ∧ (¬B2)) = x1) ∧ (
∫
(B1 ∧B2) = x2) MP 2, 4
6 ((
∫
(B1 ∧ (¬B2)) = x1) ∧ (
∫
(B1 ∧B2) = x2))⊃
(
∫
B1 = x1 + x2) RR
7
∫
B1 = x1 + x2 MP 5, 6
Figure 2:
∫
(B1 ∧ (¬B2)) = x1,
∫
(B1 ∧B2) = x2 ⊢
∫
B1 = x1 + x2.
the following formula
∀
Qα1,...,α4α11,...,α4m4 ∧ 3∧
j=1
(
xαj = xj
)⊃ (xα4 = x1 + x2 − x3)

is a theorem of RCOF.
The marginal condition is also expressible and derivable. For instance,
let A = {B1, B2}, A
′ = {B1} and U
′ = {B1}. We present in Figure 2 a
derivation for showing that∫
(B1 ∧ (¬B2)) = x1,
∫
(B1 ∧B2) = x2 ⊢
∫
B1 = x1 + x2
holds.
The next example shows how modus ponens for classical formulas is lifted
to PPL formulas. Observe that∫
α1 = 1,
∫
α1 ⊃ α2 = 1 ⊢
∫
α2 = 1
holds, as can be seen in Figure 3. Therefore, the rule
MP∗
∫
α1 = 1
∫
α1 ⊃ α2 = 1∫
α2 = 1
is admissible in the PPL calculus.
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1
∫
(α1) = 1 HYP
2
∫
(α1 ⊃ α2) = 1 HYP
3 (
∫
(α1) = 1) ⊃ ((
∫
(α1 ⊃ α2) = 1)⊃
((
∫
(α1) = 1) ∧ (
∫
(α1 ⊃ α2) = 1))) TT
4 (
∫
(α1 ⊃ α2) = 1)⊃ ((
∫
(α1) = 1) ∧ (
∫
(α1 ⊃ α2) = 1)) MP 1, 3
5 (
∫
(α1) = 1) ∧ (
∫
(α1 ⊃ α2) = 1) MP 2, 4
6 ((
∫
(α1) = 1) ∧ (
∫
(α1 ⊃ α2) = 1))⊃ (
∫
α2 = 1) RR
7
∫
α2 = 1 MP 5, 6
Figure 3:
∫
α1 = 1,
∫
α1 ⊃ α2 = 1 ⊢
∫
α2 = 1.
In the same vein it is easy to show that the rule
TT∗ ∫
α = 1
provided that c α
is also admissible in the PPL calculus. Just observe that
{φUBα : U ⊆ Bα}
is an adequate set of DNF-conjuncts for α, since α is a tautology. Then, it
is immediate to conclude that (
∫
tt = 1)⊃ (
∫
α = 1) is an RR axiom and, so,∫
α = 1 is derived from MP.
As a further illustration of the expressive power of PPL, we want to spec-
ify what is envisaged with an oblivious transfer protocol (otp) by expressing
the assumed state before and the required state after a run of the protocol.
To this end, it becomes handy to use the abbreviation
α for
∫
α = 1
to which we will return in Section 6 for establishing a conservative embedding
of CPL in PPL.
Simplifying from [Rab81], an otp is a protocol to be followed by two
agents (say John and Mary) so that John sends a bit to Mary, but remains
oblivious as to if the bit reached Mary or not, while these two alternatives
are equiprobable. Rabin proposed a protocol for solving a more general
problem (a message with several bits is to be obliviously sent by John to
Mary). The existence of such oblivious transfer protocols is quite significant
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because by building upon them one can solve other types of cryptographic
problems.
The state that is assumed before the run of the protocol and the state
required after the run can be specified using the following propositional
symbols (each with the indicated intended meaning):
JB0 (John holds bit 0)
JB1 (John holds bit 1)
MB0 (Mary holds bit 0)
MB1 (Mary holds bit 1)
JKMB0 (John knows that Mary holds bit 0)
JKMB1 (John knows that Mary holds bit 1).
Indeed, the assumed initial state can be specified by the conjunction of the
following PPL formulas:
JB0 ∨ JB1 (John holds bit 1 or holds bit 0)
(¬MB0) ∧ (¬MB1) (Mary does not hold bit 1 or bit 0),
and the envisaged final state by the conjunction of the following PPL for-
mulas:
JB0 ∨ JB1 (John holds bit 1 or holds bit 0)
(¬ JKMB0) ∧ (¬ JKMB1) (John does not know
what, if anything, Mary holds)
MB0⊃ JB0 (If Mary holds bit 0 then so does John)
MB1⊃ JB1 (If Mary holds bit 1 then so does John)∫
(MB0 ∨MB1) =
1
2
(Mary holds a bit with probability
1
2
).
It is also necessary to impose the relevant epistemic requirements:
JKMB0⊃MB0
JKMB1⊃MB1.
This example shows the practical interest of developing a probabilistic epis-
temic dynamic logic as an enrichment of PPL, endeavour that we leave for
future work.
Observe that in the previous example we only needed a finite number
of propositional symbols. But a key novelty of PPL is the possibility of
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working with a denumerable set of propositional symbols. This capability
of PPL adds a lot to its expressive power.
As an illustration, consider the encoding in PPL of the halting problem
(as originally introduced in [Tur37]):
Does Turing machine i halts on input j?
In this case we need the following propositional symbols (with the indicated
intended meaning):
Hijk (Machine i halts on input j in k steps) for each i, j, k ∈ N
Hij (Machine i halts on input j) for each i, j ∈ N.
Using this denumerable set of propositional symbols, consider the PPL the-
ory with the following set of proper axioms:
AxH = {Hijk ⊃ Hij : i, j, k ∈ N}
∪
{Hijk : machine i halts on input j in k steps}.
It is straightforward to establish the following fact about this theory for each
i, j ∈ N:
(i) AxH ⊢ Hij iff (ii) machine i halts on input j.
Indeed, it is easy to present a derivation for obtaining (i) from (ii). On
the other hand, obtaining (ii) from (i) requires the (strong) soundness of
the calculus of PPL, the first result in Section 5. Observe that AxH is
decidable as required of a set of axioms. However, (AxH)
⊢ is undecidable
(since otherwise, thanks to the fact above, the halting problem would also
be decidable). So, this example shows that, in PPL, Γ⊢ may be undecidable
even when Γ is assumed to be decidable. But ∅⊢ is decidable, the last result
of Section 6.
The probabilistic capabilities of PPL would be needed for developing a
similar theory for probabilistic Turing machines. To this end, we may take{∫
Hijk = x1 ⊃
∫
Hij ≥ x1 : i, j, k ∈ N
}
∪{∫
Hijk = p : machine i halts on input j in k steps with probability p
R
}
as the set of proper axioms.
Notwithstanding their simplicity, the examples above should be enough
to assess the power of PPL for describing probabilistic systems and reasoning
about them.
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5 Soundness and weak completeness
In this section we show that the calculus for PPL is (strongly) sound and
weakly complete. Observe that strong completeness is obviously out of ques-
tion since the PPL entailment is not compact (as mentioned in Section 4).
Theorem 5.1 The logic PPL is sound.
Proof: The rules are sound. We only check that axiom RR is sound since
the proof of the others is straightforward.
(RR) is sound. Let V be a stochastic valuation and ρ an assignment over
R. Assume that
V ρ 
∫
αj @j pj for each j = 1, . . . , k
and that the formula
∀
Qα1,...,αk+1α11,...,αk+1mk+1 ∧ k∧
j=1
(
xαj @j pj
)⊃ (xαk+1 @k+1 pk+1)

is in RCOF. Let ρ′ be an assignment over R such that,
ρ′(xα) = ProbV (α)
and ρ′(x) = ρ(x) for every x ∈ XN. Then,
Rρ′ fo Q
α1,...,αk+1
α11,...,αk+1mk+1
∧
k∧
j=1
(
xαj @j pj
)
.
Therefore,
Rρ′ fo xαk+1 @k+1 pk+1
Hence, ρ′(xαk+1) @k+1 p
Rρ′
k+1 and so ProbV (αk+1) @k+1 p
Rρ
k+1. Therefore V ρ ∫
αk+1 @k+1 pk+1. QED
We now proceed towards the weak completeness of the calculus. We start
by proving an important lemma showing that we can move back and forth
between satisfaction of RCOF formulas expressing probabilistic reasoning
and satisfaction of PPL formulas.
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Proposition 5.2 Let ϕ be a formula of PPL and α1, . . . , αk be the propo-
sitional formulas such that
∫
αj @j pj occurs in ϕ for each j = 1, . . . , k.
Moreover, let Λ = {α11, . . . , αkmk} be an adequate set of DNF-conjuncts for
{α1, . . . , αk}. Let ρ be an assignment over R. Assume that
Rρ fo Q
α1,...,αk
α11,...,αkmk
.
Then, there is a stochastic valuation V such that
V ρ  ϕ iff Rρfo ψ
where ψ is the RCOF formula obtained from ϕ by substituting xα @ p for
each PPL formula
∫
α@ p.
Proof: Let A ∈ ℘finB and ηA : ℘A→ [0, 1] be such that
ηA(U) =
1
2|A\BΛ|
∑
U ′ ⊆ BΛ
U ′ ∩ A = U ∩ BΛ
ρ(x
φU
′
BΛ
).
Note that 0 ≤ ρ(x
φU
′
BΛ
) ≤ 1 since Rρ fo Q
α1,...,αk
α11,...,αkmk
. We start by showing
that ηA is a finite-dimensional probability distribution. Observe that
∑
U⊆A
ηA(U) =
∑
U⊆A
1
2|A\BΛ|
∑
U ′ ⊆ BΛ
U ′ ∩ A = U ∩ BΛ
ρ(x
φU
′
BΛ
)
=
1
2|A\BΛ|
∑
U⊆A
∑
U ′ ⊆ BΛ
U ′ ∩A = U ∩ BΛ
ρ(x
φU
′
BΛ
)
= 1
since∑
U⊆A
∑
U ′ ⊆ BΛ
U ′ ∩A = U ∩ BΛ
ρ(x
φU
′
BΛ
) =
∑
U1⊆A\BΛ
∑
U2⊆A∩BΛ
∑
U ′ ⊆ BΛ
U ′ ∩ A = U2
ρ(x
φU
′
BΛ
)
=
∑
U1⊆A\BΛ
∑
U ′⊆BΛ
ρ(x
φU
′
BΛ
) (∗)
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=
∑
U1⊆A\BΛ
1 (∗∗)
= 2|A\BΛ|
where (∗) follows from the fact that there is a bijection from
{(U ′, U2) : U
′ ⊆ BΛ, U
′ ∩A = U2, U2 ⊆ A ∩BΛ} to {U
′ : U ′ ⊆ BΛ}
and (∗∗) holds because Rρ fo Q
α1,...,αk
α11,...,αkmk
.
Now we prove that {ηA}A∈℘finB satisfies the marginal condition. Let A ⊆ A
′,
A′ ⊆ B and U ⊆ A. Then,
ηA(U) =
1
2|A\BΛ|
∑
U ′ ⊆ BΛ
U ′ ∩ A = U ∩ BΛ
ρ(x
φU
′
BΛ
)
=
1
2|A′\BΛ|
1
2|A\BΛ|
2|A
′\BΛ|
∑
U ′ ⊆ BΛ
U ′ ∩ A = U ∩ BΛ
ρ(x
φU
′
BΛ
)
=
1
2|A′\BΛ|
1
2|A\BΛ|
2|A\BΛ|
∑
U ′′ ⊆ A′
U ′′ ∩A = U
∑
U ′ ⊆ BΛ
U ′ ∩ A′ = U ′′ ∩ BΛ
ρ(x
φU
′
BΛ
) (∗)
=
∑
U ′′ ⊆ A′
U ′′ ∩A = U
1
2|A
′\BΛ|
∑
U ′ ⊆ BΛ
U ′ ∩ A′ = U ′′ ∩ BΛ
ρ(x
φU
′
BΛ
)
=
∑
U ′′ ⊆ A′
U ′′ ∩A = U
ηA′(U
′′)
where (∗) holds since:
2|A
′\BΛ|
∑
U ′ ⊆ BΛ
U ′ ∩A = U ∩ BΛ
ρ(x
φU
′
BΛ
)
=
∑
U ′′⊆A′\BΛ
∑
U ′ ⊆ BΛ
U ′ ∩ A = U ∩ BΛ
ρ(x
φU
′
BΛ
)
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=
∑
U ′′′⊆A\BΛ
∑
U ′′ ⊆ A′
U ′′ ∩ A = U
∑
U ′ ⊆ BΛ
U ′ ∩ A′ = U ′′ ∩ BΛ
ρ(x
φU
′
BΛ
) (∗∗)
= 2|A\BΛ|
∑
U ′′ ⊆ A′
U ′′ ∩ A = U
∑
U ′ ⊆ BΛ
U ′ ∩ A′ = U ′′ ∩ BΛ
ρ(x
φU
′
BΛ
)
and where (∗∗) holds since there is a bijection f from
{(U ′′, U ′) : U ′′ ⊆ A′ \BΛ, U
′ ⊆ BΛ, U
′ ∩A = U ∩BΛ}
to
{(W ′′′,W ′′,W ′) : W ′′′ ⊆ A \BΛ,W
′′ ⊆ A′,
W ′′ ∩A = U,W ′ ∩A′ =W ′′ ∩BΛ,W
′ ⊆ BΛ}
such that
f(U ′′, U ′) = (U ′′ ∩A,U ∪ (U ′′ ∩ (A′ \ A)) ∪ (U ′ ∩ (A′ \A)), U ′).
Indeed,
(a) f(U ′′, U ′) is in the range of f :
(i) W ′′′ ⊆ A \ BΛ. Note that W
′′′ = U ′′ ∩ A. Hence, W ′′′ ⊆ A. Moreover,
since U ′′ ⊆ B \BΛ then W
′′′ ⊆ B \BΛ.
(ii) W ′′ ⊆ A′. Note that W ′′ = U ∪ (U ′′∩ (A′ \A))∪ (U ′ ∩ (A′ \A)) and that
U ⊆ A ⊆ A′, U ′′ ∩ (A′ \ A) ⊆ A′ and U ′ ∩ (A′ \A) ⊆ A′.
(iii)W ′′∩A = U . It is sufficient to note thatW ′′ = U∪(U ′′∩(A′\A))∪(U ′∩
(A′ \A)) and that U ∩A = U , U ′′∩(A′ \A)∩A = ∅ and U ′∩(A′ \A)∩A = ∅.
(iv) W ′ ∩A′ =W ′′ ∩BΛ. It is sufficient to note that W
′′ = U ∪ (U ′′ ∩ (A′ \
A))∪ (U ′ ∩ (A′ \A)) and that U ∩BΛ = U
′ ∩A, U ′′ ∩ (A′ \A)∩BΛ = ∅ and
U ′ ∩ (A′ \A) ∩BΛ = U
′ ∩ (A′ \ A). So, W ′′ ∩BΛ = U
′ ∩A′ =W ′ ∩A′.
(v) W ′ ⊆ BΛ. Immediate since U
′ ⊆ BΛ.
(b) f is injective. Assume that f(U ′′1 , U
′
1) = f(U
′′
2 , U
′
2). Then U
′
1 = U
′
2.
Moreover, U ′′1 ∩A = U
′′
2 ∩A and
U ∪ (U ′′1 ∩ (A
′ \A))∪ (U ′1 ∩ (A
′ \A)) = U ∪ (U ′′2 ∩ (A
′ \A))∪ (U ′2 ∩ (A
′ \A)).
Observe that U ′′i ∩ (A
′ \ A) ∩ U = ∅ and U ′′i ∩ (A
′ \ A) ∩ U ′i ∩ (A
′ \ A) = ∅
for i = 1, 2. Hence, U ′′1 ∩ (A
′ \ A) = U ′′2 ∩ (A
′ \A). So
U ′′1 = U
′′
1 ∩A
′
= U ′′1 ∩ (A ∪ (A
′ \ A))
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= (U ′′1 ∩A) ∪ (U
′′
1 ∩ (A
′ \ A))
= (U ′′2 ∩A) ∪ (U
′′
2 ∩ (A
′ \ A))
= U ′′2 .
(c) f is surjective. Let (W ′′′,W ′′,W ′) be in the range of f . Take
U ′′ =W ′′′ ∪ ((W ′′ \ A) \BΛ), U
′ =W ′.
(i) (U ′′, U ′) is in the domain of f :
- U ′′ ⊆ A′ \BΛ. Note that U
′′ =W ′′′ ∪ ((W ′′ \A) \BΛ), W
′′′ ⊆ A ⊆ A′ and
W ′′′ ⊆ B \BΛ. So, W
′′′ ⊆ A′ \BΛ. On the other hand, (W
′′ \A) \BΛ ⊆ A
′
since W ′′ ⊆ A′ and (W ′′ \ A) \BΛ ⊆ B \BΛ. So, U
′′ ⊆ A′ \BΛ.
- U ′ ⊆ BΛ. Immediate since W
′ ⊆ BΛ.
- U ′ ∩A = U ∩BΛ. Observe that
U ∩BΛ = W
′′ ∩BΛ ∩A)
= W ′ ∩A′ ∩A)
= W ′ ∩A)
= U ′ ∩A.
(ii) f(U ′′, U ′) = (W ′′′,W ′′,W ′). Indeed:
- U ′′ ∩A =W ′′′. In fact
U ′′ ∩A = (W ′′′ ∪ ((W ′′ \A) \BΛ)) ∩A)
= (W ′′′ ∩A) ∪ (((W ′′ \A) \BΛ) ∩A))
= W ′′′ ∩A)
= W ′′′.
- U ∪ (U ′′ ∩ (A′ \A)) ∪ (U ′ ∩ (A′ \ A)) =W ′′. In fact
U ∪ (U ′′ ∩ (A′ \ A)) ∪ (U ′ ∩ (A′ \ A)) =
U ∪ ((W ′′′ ∪ ((W ′′ \ A) \BΛ)) ∩ (A
′ \ A)) ∪ (W ′ ∩ (A′ \ A)) =
U ∪ (((W ′′ \ A) \BΛ) ∩ (A
′ \ A)) ∪ (W ′ ∩ (A′ \ A)) =
U ∪ ((W ′′ \A) \BΛ) ∪ ((W
′′ ∩BΛ) \ A) =
U ∪ (W ′′ \ A) =
(W ′′ ∩A) ∪ (W ′′ \ A) =
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W ′′.
Hence, using Kolmogorov’s existence theorem, there exists a unique stochas-
tic valuation V having these finite-dimensional distributions.
Finally, we show, by induction on the structure of ϕ, that
V ρ  ϕ iff Rρ fo ψ.
Base: ϕ is
∫
αj @j pj. Observe first that:
ProbV (αj) =
∑
U∈[[αj ]]
Prob(VBαj = U)
=
∑
U∈{v∩BΛ,vcαj}
Prob(VBΛ = U) (∗)
=
∑
v∩BΛ,vcαj
ηBΛ(v ∩BΛ)
=
∑
v∩BΛ,vcαj
ρ(x
φ
v∩BΛ
BΛ
)
=
∑
ℓ=1,...,mj
ρ(xαjℓ) (∗∗)
= ρ(xαj ) (∗∗∗)
where (∗) holds by Proposition 2.4, (∗∗) holds since {α11, . . . , αkmk} is an
adequate set of DNF-conjuncts for {α1, . . . , αk}, and (∗∗∗) holds since Rρfo
Q
α1,...,αk
α11,...,αkmk
. Then,
(←) Assume that Rρfoxαj@jpj. Then ρ(xαj )@j p
Rρ
j . So, ProbV (αj)@j p
Rρ
j .
Hence, V ρ  ϕ.
(→) Assume that V ρ 
∫
αj @j pj. Then ProbV (αj)@j p
Rρ
j . Thus, ρ(xαj )@j
p
Rρ
j and so Rρ fo ψ.
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Step: ϕ is ϕ1 ⊃ ϕ2. Then
Rρ fo ψ1 ⊃ ψ2
iff
Rρ 6 foψ1 or Rρ fo ψ2
iff IH
V ρ 6 ϕ1 or V ρ  ϕ2
iff
V ρ  ϕ
where ψ1 and ψ2 are formulas obtained from ϕ1 and ϕ2, respectively, by
replacing each formula
∫
α@ p by xα @ p. QED
Proposition 5.3 Let ϕ ∈ LPPL. Then, there is ψ ∈ LPPL such that
⊢ ϕ≡ ψ
and ψ is in disjunctive normal form. Moreover, if ϕ is consistent then there
is a conjunction of literals in ψ that is also consistent.
Theorem 5.4 The logic PPL is weakly complete.
Proof:
Let ϕ ∈ LPPL. Assume that 6⊢ ϕ. We proceed to show that 6 ϕ. First
observe that ¬ϕ must be consistent in the sense that ¬ϕ 6⊢ ff because
otherwise from ¬ϕ one would be able to derive every formula, including in
particular, ¬ϕ⊃ϕ, and in that case one would have ⊢ ϕ. By Proposition 5.3,
⊢ (¬ϕ)≡
∨
m∈M
ηm
where each disjunct is a conjunction of literals. Since ¬ϕ is consistent,
at least one of the disjuncts must also be consistent. Let ηm be one such
consistent disjunct. In order to show that 6 ϕ it is enough to show that
¬ϕ is satisfiable. Hence, it is enough to show that there is one satisfiable
disjunct. Indeed, ηm is satisfiable. Towards a contradiction, assume that
there are no V and ρ such that V ρ  ηm holds. Let ηm be of the form
(
∫
α1 @1 p1) ∧ . . . ∧ (
∫
αk @k pk).
Let
{α11, . . . , α1m1 , . . . , αk1, . . . , αkmk} ⊂ L
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be an adequate set of DNF-conjuncts for {α1, . . . , αk} ⊂ L. Then, by Propo-
sition 5.2, there would not exist ρ and such that
Rρ fo Q
α1,...,αk
α11,...,αkmk
∧
 k∧
j=1
(
xαj @j pj
) .
Hence, we would have
∀
Qα1,...,αkα11,...,αkmk ∧ k∧
j=1
(
xαj @j pj
)⊃ ff
 ∈ RCOF.
Then, by RR, we would establish
ηm ⊢ ff
in contradiction with the consistency of ηm. QED
6 Conservativeness and decidability
In this section we start by working towards showing that PPL is a con-
servative extension of classical propositional logic modulo a translation of
classical formulas into the language of PPL.
Given α ∈ L, we denote by α∗ the PPL formula
∫
α = 1. Moreover, given
∆ ⊆ L, we denote by ∆∗ the set {δ∗ : δ ∈ ∆}.
Proposition 6.1 Letting ∆ ∪ {α} ⊆ L, If ∆ ⊢c α then ∆
∗ ⊢ α∗.
Proof:
Just observe that if α1, . . . , αn is a derivation sequence of α = αn from
∆ in CPL, then, making good use of TT∗ and MP∗ (the admissible rules
established in Subsection 4.4), α∗1, . . . , α
∗
n is a derivation sequence of α
∗
from ∆∗ in PPL. QED
Theorem 6.2 Let ∆ ∪ {α} ⊆ L. Then
∆∗  α∗ iff ∆ c α.
Proof:
(→) Assume that ∆∗  α∗. Let v be a (classical) valuation such that v c δ
for every δ ∈ ∆. Then, by Proposition 3.2, ProbV v (δ) ≥ 1 for every δ ∈ ∆.
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Input: formula ϕ of PPL.
1. Let Bϕ := {Bj : Bj ∈ B and Bj occurs in ϕ};
2. Let {α1, . . . , αk} := {α :
∫
α@ p occurs in ϕ};
3. Let ψ be the formula obtained from ϕ by replacing each formula
∫
α@p
by xα @ p;
4. For each j = 1, . . . , k:
(a) Let {αj1, . . . , αjmj} := ADNF(αj , Bϕ);
5. Return ARCOF
(
∀
(
Q
α1,...,αk
α11,...,αkmk
⊃ ψ
))
.
Figure 4: Algorithm APPL.
Hence, V v 
∫
δ = 1 for every δ ∈ ∆. Thus, V v 
∫
α = 1 and, so,
ProbV v(α) = 1. Therefore, using the same proposition, v c α.
(←) Assume that ∆ c α. Then, thanks to the previous proposition, ∆
∗ ⊢ α∗
and, so, by Theorem 5.1, ∆∗  α∗. QED
We now concentrate on the decidability of the PPL validity problem. For
this purpose we assume given the following two algorithms. Let ADNF be an
algorithm that receives a propositional formula α and a set of propositional
symbols A ⊇ Bα, and returns a set {β1, . . . , βm} of conjunctions of literals
such that each Bβi = A, β1 ∨ . . .∨ βm is a disjunctive normal form of α and
6c βi ≡ βj for 1 ≤ i 6= j ≤ m. Furthermore, let ARCOF be an algorithm for
deciding the validity of sentences in RCOF.
The procedure in Figure 4 receives a PPL formula and returns true when-
ever the formula is valid and false otherwise. Indeed, the following theorem
establishes that the execution of APPL always terminates and does so with
the correct output.
Theorem 6.3 The procedure APPL is an algorithm. Moreover, APPL is
correct.
Proof:
It is straightforward to verify that the execution of APPL always terminate,
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returning either true or false, so we focus on correctness:
(i) We start by showing that if APPL(ϕ) is true then ϕ is a valid formula of
PPL. Let ϕ be a formula of PPL. Assume that APPL(ϕ) is true. Then,
ARCOF
(
∀
(
Qα1,...,αkα11,...,αkmk
⊃ ψ
))
is true. Let V be a stochastic valuation and ρ an assignment. Let ρ′ be an
assignment over R such that,
ρ′(xα) = ProbV (α)
and ρ′(x) = ρ(x) for every x ∈ XN. We now show that
Rρ′ fo Q
α1,...,αk
α11,...,αkmk
.
Recall that ProbV is an Adams’ probability assignment (Theorem 2.7).
Hence, ProbV satisfies Adams’ postulates. Therefore:
Rρ′ fo
∧
U⊆Bϕ
0 ≤ xφU
Bϕ
≤ 1
since ρ′(xφUBϕ
) = ProbV (φ
U
Bϕ
) and using postulate P1. Moreover,
Rρ′ fo
∑
U⊆Bϕ
xφU
Bϕ
= 1
by postulates P2 and P4 since
c
∨
U⊆Bϕ
φUBϕ
by Proposition 2.2, and using the fact that ρ′(xφUBϕ
) = ProbV (φ
U
Bϕ
) and
c ¬(αjℓ ∧ αjℓ′) for every j = 1, . . . , k and 1 ≤ ℓ 6= ℓ
′ ≤ mj. Finally,
k′∧
j=1
(
xαj =
mj∑
ℓ=1
xαjℓ
)
.
since
ProbV (αj) = ProbV (
∨
1≤ℓ≤mj
αjℓ)
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by postulate P3, and since, by postulate P4
ProbV (
∨
1≤ℓ≤mj
αjℓ) =
mj∑
ℓ=1
ProbV (αjℓ).
Hence, Rρ′ fo Q
α1,...,αk
α11,...,αkmk
. Moreover
Rfo∀
(
Qα1,...,αkα11,...,αkmk
⊃ ψ
)
and so Rρ′ fo ψ.
We now show, by induction on the structure of ϕ, that
Rρ′ fo ψ iff V ρ  ϕ.
Base: ϕ is
∫
α@ p. Then
Rρ′ fo xα @ p iff ρ
′(xα) @ p
Rρ′ iff ProbV (α) @ p
Rρ iff V ρ 
∫
α@ p.
Step: ϕ is ϕ1 ⊃ ϕ2. Then
Rρ′ fo ψ1 ⊃ ψ2
iff
Rρ′ 6 foψ1 or Rρ
′
fo ψ2
iff IH
V ρ 6 ϕ1 or V ρ  ϕ2
iff
V ρ  ϕ
where ψ1 and ψ2 are formulas obtained from ϕ1 and ϕ2, respectively, by
replacing each formula
∫
α@ p by xα @ p. Therefore,  ϕ.
(ii) We now show that if APPL(ϕ) is false then ϕ is not a valid formula of PPL.
By contraposition, assume that  ϕ. We prove that, for every assignment ρ
over R,
Rρ fo∀
(
Qα1,...,αkα11,...,αkmk
⊃ ψ
)
.
Assume that
Rρ fo Q
α1,...,αk
α11,...,αkmk
.
Let V be the stochastic valuation induced by ρ as defined in Proposition 5.2.
Then, V ρ  ϕ since  ϕ and, so, by the same proposition, Rρ fo ψ.
Therefore,
ARCOF
(
∀
(
Qα1,...,αkα11,...,αkmk
⊃ ψ
))
returns true and so does APPL(ϕ). QED
38
7 Concluding remarks
Always within the setting of propositional logic we looked at ways of intro-
ducing probabilistic reasoning into logic.
First, towards assigning probabilities to valuations we proposed to look
at a random valuation as a stochastic process indexed by the set of propo-
sitional symbols. This novel notion (of stochastic valuation as we called it)
has the advantage of allowing the use of Kolmogorov’s existence theorem
for moving from the finite-dimensional probability distributions to the dis-
tribution in the underlying probability space. In particular, the existence
theorem was quite useful in establishing the equivalence between Adams’
probability assignments to formulas and stochastic valuations.
Afterwards, we investigated the notion of probabilistic entailment in the
scenario of leaving the propositional language unchanged. We found that the
notion previously proposed in the literature does not enjoy key properties
of logical consequence. For this reason, we proposed a more appropriate
notion of probabilistic entailment. This notion turned out to be identical to
classical entailment.
Since nothing is gained by introducing probabilities without changing the
language, we decided to set-up a small enrichment (PPL) of classical propo-
sitional logic by adding a language construct, inspired by [FHM90, HM01,
MSS05], that allows the constraining (without nesting) of the probability of
a formula.
The resulting extension of classical propositional logic was shown to be
rich enough for setting-up interesting theories and easy to axiomatize by
relying on the decidable theory of real closed ordered fields (RCOF). In due
course, we proved that the extension is conservative and still decidable.
Note that a finite set of propositional symbols was assumed in the log-
ics previously reported in the literature that allow the constraining of the
probability of a formula, while PPL provides the means for working with
a denumerable set of propositional symbols, adding a lot to its expressive
power. To this end, the notion of stochastic valuation as a stochastic process
was a key ingredient.
Concerning future work, it seems worthwhile to investigate other meta-
properties of PPL, starting with bounding the complexity of its decision
problem. We expect this complexity to be much lower than the complexity
of RCOF theoremhood, since we only need to recognize RCOF theorems of
a very simple clausal form.
Strong completeness of the PPL axiomatization was out of question be-
cause the semantics over R led to a non-compact entailment. Relaxing the
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semantics by allowing any model of RCOF may open the door to establish-
ing strong completeness. Clearly, one should start by investigating whether
Kolmogorov existence theorem can be carried over to every RCOF model.
The relevance of abduction in probabilistic reasoning was recognized
in [HRWW11]. One would like to be able to compute the required probability
of the conjunction of the relevant hypotheses in order to ensure an envisaged
probability for the conclusion. In this front, we expect to be able to find
inspiration in the calculus presented in [SRSM14], given its abductive nature,
towards developing an abduction calculus for PPL.
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